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Developing proactive MethoDs for general aviation Data collection
INTRODUCTION
Operating a general aviation (GA) aircraft, particularly 
when flying cross-country, requires dedicated planning 
and decision-making involving such issues as the route 
of flight, terrain and obstacles one might encounter, and 
the threat of adverse weather. Some of these challenges 
remain fixed (e.g., terrain and other obstacles) and are 
relatively straightforward to address, while others, such 
as weather, are dynamic and can pose unique challenges 
to pilots. Indeed, even the best flight plans can prove 
inadequate or incomplete where the volatile nature of 
adverse weather is concerned.
Even with its unpredictable nature, pilots are still 
expected to fully understand the weather enroute and to 
avoid severe weather when planning and executing their 
flight (National Transportation Safety Board, 2006). 
Specifically, Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 
Part 91.103 mandates that when conducting a flight under 
instrument flight rules (IFR) or away from the airport 
pilots should become familiar with weather reports and 
forecasts (Federal Aviation Regulations/Aeronautical 
Information Manual, 2009).
Despite the regulations that require pilots to fully un-
derstand and appreciate the risk associated with adverse 
weather, weather-related GA accidents continue to occur. 
To put this in perspective, over the last 20 years, nearly 
40,000 GA aircraft have been involved in accidents; 
of these, roughly 20% involved fatalities (Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 2009). Notably, many of those fatal accidents 
involved encounters with adverse weather (Detwiler, 
Boquet, Holcomb, Hackworth, Wiegmann, & Shappell, 
2006; Wiegmann, Boquet, Detwiler, Holcomb, Faaborg, 
& Shappell, 2005; NTSB, 2005).
So, why would a pilot fly into adverse weather, particu-
larly when the consequences can be so dire? unfortunately, 
the answer continues to be debated among academics and 
regulators, alike. Some of the more prevailing explanations 
have recently been summarized by Wiegmann, Talleur, 
and Johnson (2008) and include:
• Lack of knowledge and experience (Goh & Wiegmann, 
2002; O’Hare & Owen, 2002; Wiegmann, Goh, & 
O’Hare, 2002)
• Poor pre-flight planning (Wiggins, Stevens, Howard, 
Henley, & O’Hare, 2002; Wiggins & O’Hare, 2003)
• Limited weather-evaluation skills (Goh & Wiegmann, 
2001; Wiegmann, et al., 2002; Burian, Orasanu, & 
Hitt, 2000; Wiggins & O’Hare, 2003)
• Low risk perception/overconfidence (Goh & Wieg-
mann, 2001)
• Poor in-flight planning (Detwiler et al., 2006; Stokes, 
Belger, & Zhang, 1990; Knecht, 2005)
• Inability to execute a 180 degree turn (Wiegmann & 
Goh, 2003; AOPA, 2004)
Some have even suggested that encounters with adverse 
weather represent the willful disregard for the rules and 
regulations (Wiegmann et al., 2005). After all, it is in-
comprehensible to some that a pilot who sees threatening 
weather in his path would elect to continue into it if a 
safer alternative is available. The problem with this latter 
view is that it is based upon accident data that are argu-
ably limited, particularly when the pilot is fatally injured, 
and the exact causes of accidents are based as much on 
conjecture and expert opinion as they are on fact. 
Despite the uncertain nature of fatal accident data, 
aviation safety has historically been driven by accident 
databases archived and maintained by organizations like 
the National Transportation Board (NTSB) and Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA). However, at some point, 
relying solely on accident data will yield fewer and fewer 
positive interventions – particularly as the historical ac-
cident rates are driven down to the level of rare events. 
This is precisely what has happened within the com-
mercial aviation industry. As a result, emphasis within 
commercial aviation has moved from accident data to 
more proactive and normative data sources and risk 
analysis. For instance, programs like flight operations 
quality assurance (FOQA), the aviation safety action 
program (ASAP), and line operations safety audits (LOSA) 
have been developed and embraced by the commercial 
aviation industry.
At a minimum, these proactive and normative data 
sources have expanded our understanding of the human 
factors associated with commercial aviation accidents and 
incidents and have broadened how accident/incident 
causation is viewed. However, even established data-
collection tools like these continue to be modified and 
have yet to be leveraged throughout the aviation industry 
– particularly GA where equipment, programs, and access 
are less regulated and standardized.
Left with few alternatives, many studies of GA flight 
into adverse weather have utilized simulation, surveys, 
and structured interviews. One particularly unique study 
of interviewed pilots was that they were flying in the vi-
cinity of, but not directly involved in, a weather-related 
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accident (NTSB, 2005). This study was conducted to 
render a different perspective than that of the accident 
pilot, who in most cases is fatally injured. This represented 
a significant departure from traditional accident studies in 
that the pilots interviewed were not directly involved in 
the accident but were exposed to similar environmental 
conditions (e.g., weather and terrain). Among the more 
notable findings were:
• A pilot who starts flying earlier in life is at lower risk of 
being involved in a weather-related GA accident than 
those who start flying when they are older.
• Chronological age at the time a pilot obtains a license 
to fly is a better predictor of future accident involve-
ment than age at time of flight.
• Periodic training and evaluation may be necessary to 
ensure that pilots maintain weather-related knowledge 
and skills. 
• GA pilots routinely consult other sources of aviation 
weather to obtain information that is not currently 
available from a standard weather briefing (i.e., Flight 
Service Station).
As useful as the NTSB study was, most would agree 
that information from a pilot involved with the adverse 
weather encounter would be even more valuable. The 
challenge is to identify a source of data involving actual 
pilot encounters with adverse weather. 
One relatively untapped source of information is near-
miss data. By definition, these are not accidents and, as 
such, the pilots involved are alive and can presumably 
recount their decision process. Of course, this assumes that 
those issues that influence performance during accidents 
also influence near misses in a similar way.
One such “near-miss” database already exists. The Avia-
tion Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is an anonymous da-
tabase that relies on self-reported incidents and near-miss 
data. However, ASRS reports are not necessarily focused 
on any specific type of incident or near-miss. Moreover, 
they require the individual to self-report, which may 
constrain submitted information, and certainly does not 
go to the level of detail required for a full understanding 
of pilot decision-making (Macrae, 2009). In sum, what 
is needed is a better understanding of exactly how and 
why a GA pilot would encounter adverse weather straight 
from the source – the pilot who made the decision and 
experienced the weather encounter. 
METHOD
Although there are more traditional ways to identify 
pilots who encountered adverse weather and survived 
(e.g., NTSB accident records and ASRS reports), this 
study employed two previously untapped resources: 1) 
the Administrators’ Daily Alert Bulletins that identify 
incidents, accidents, and pilot deviations on a daily basis, 
and 2) air traffic control flight assists. The latter occur 
when pilots request the assistance of air traffic controllers 
to navigate their aircraft or when an air traffic controller 
initiates an interaction with a pilot for safety purposes. 
Many of these interactions involving flight through or 
around adverse weather are reported to responsible FAA 
officials and were of particular interest. Monitoring these 
events is consistent with FAA order 8000.1, Safety Man-
agement System Doctrine, which states:
The safety assurance process continually assesses activity 
to identify new hazards and to ensure risk controls achieve 
their intended objectives throughout the system life cycle. 
New hazards may be those not identified during the SRM 
process or those introduced by the risk controls. This in-
cludes assessment of the need for new risk controls or to 
eliminate or modify risk controls that are ineffective or are 
no longer needed due to changes in the operational envi-
ronment. Every SMS includes a process for continuously 
monitoring systems of interest to identify new hazards or 
the need to change risk controls or other risk management 
responses. These monitoring activities apply to an SMS 
whether the operations are accomplished internally or 
outsourced. (FAA Order 8000.1, Section 2-5.3.a.).
With both data sources, attention was paid to events 
involving visual flight rules (VFR) into instrument 
meteorological conditions (IMC), convective and icing 
encounters, and instrument-rated pilot control difficul-
ties in actual IMC.
Participants
More than 175 events were reviewed, of which 115 
were included as candidates for this study. Scientists 
from the FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) 
contacted the Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) 
aviation safety inspectors (ASIs) responsible for the 
candidate events to describe the project objectives and 
request permission to communicate with the involved 
pilot. Note that in some cases no investigation had been 
conducted prior to CAMI contact. In total, more than 160 
ASIs from roughly 55 different FSDOs were contacted.
From the ASI inquiries, approximately 50 poten-
tial participants were identified and contacted via 
the telephone, E-mail, or postal mail, depending on 
the type of contact information received. After be-
ing briefed on the purpose of the project, including 
the anonymous nature of their responses, pilots who 
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agreed to participate were provided a consent form 
and scheduled for a telephone interview.
Twenty-seven pilots who experienced an adverse 
weather encounter were subsequently interviewed. Two 
pilot interviews were eliminated because one was inter-
viewed during initial beta testing, and the other did not 
meet our research needs. This left 25 pilot interviews in 
the final analysis.
Instrument
The roughly one-hour interview was developed using 
surveys previously employed by the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) and the FAA (NASA, 
2007; Knecht, 2008a and 2008b). The structured inter-
view included several items on basic aircraft and pilot 
demographics, a description of the event, preflight plan-
ning, and weather decision-making. A brief description 
of each section of the structured interview follows:
Aircraft Demographics 
 Pilots were asked standard demographic questions, 
such as the type of aircraft they were flying during the 
weather encounter and whether they leased, partially, or 
fully owned the aircraft.
Pilot Demographics
  In addition to traditional demographic questions 
like education, profession, gender, and age, several items 
regarding piloting experience and training were asked of 
the pilots. Specifically, they were asked: 
• When they first learned to fly
• The date of their most recent flight instruction
• The date of their most recent biennial flight review
• Class of medical certificate they held and whether any 
waivers or limitations were attached
• Ratings and certificates they held (e.g., single engine 
land, certified flight instructor, and instrument rating)
• Flight hours flown before the adverse weather encounter 
(total and 90 days prior to the event)
• Number of cross-country flight hours flown before 
the adverse weather encounter (total and 90 days 
prior to the event)
• Instrument flight hours flown before the adverse 
weather encounter (simulated and actual instrument 
flight)
• Type of equipment (e.g., weather-avoidance, terrain-
avoidance, autopilot, GPS, and de-icing) onboard 
the aircraft; if onboard, was it used during the flight 
and had the pilot received formal training for its use
• Whether they participated in FAA-sponsored WINGS 
programs
• Whether they obtained a good night’s sleep before 
the flight
• Whether they were suffering from any illness the day 
of the flight
Event Information 
 Pilots were asked to describe their weather encounter 
in detail. Several additional demographic questions related 
to the flight were also asked, including:
• Purpose of the flight (i.e., business or pleasure)
• Had they flown the route before and if so, how many 
times?
• Planned length of flight
• Departure airport
• Approximate temperature at departure
• Time of departure
• Planned destination airport
• Type of approach planned for destination (i.e., Visual, 
Cat I, II, or III)
• Planned alternate destination airport
• Whether they communicated with ATC or any other 
services (e.g., Flight Service Stations) while enroute
• In-flight services requested (e.g., an emergency climb/
descent, vectors to an airport or visual meteorological 
conditions (VMC), pilot reports (PIREPS), weather 
updates, or instrument approach procedures)
• Lighting conditions (e.g., daylight, night, dusk, dawn)
• Weather conditions (i.e., IMC, VMC, marginal VMC) 
at departure, enroute, and at the destination
• Time of arrival at their intended or alternative des-
tination
Preflight Planning 
 Of particular interest in this study was the method 
of preflight weather planning employed by the pilots. 
Pilots were asked to describe their normal method of 
preflight planning and whether it was different the day 
of the weather encounter. They were also asked:
• Whether they attempted to obtain pre-flight weather 
information
• The last time they checked weather before flight
• Which weather providers they typically use when 
planning a flight (e.g., National Weather Service, 
flight service stations, direct user access terminal, and 
hazardous in-flight weather advisory service) and if 
those were used before the incident flight
• Were any attempts to obtain pre-flight weather infor-
mation unsuccessful and if so, why?
• Whether the actual weather experienced was the same 
as, better, or worse than predicted when they departed, 
enroute, and at their planned destination
• Whether they considered the geography along the 
flight route (e.g., mountains and rising terrain)
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Enroute decision-making 
 Because all participants had encountered adverse 
weather, several questions were asked regarding their 
enroute decision-making. Specifically, pilots were asked:
• Whether they were under any pressure to get to their 
destination
• Whether they were aware of their course and location 
throughout the flight
• Whether there were any distractions in the cockpit
• Whether all the equipment was working during the 
flight
• What was their level of weather awareness during 
the flight
• What was their thought process upon entering the 
weather
• How did they feel upon encountering the weather
• Had they ever experienced similar weather conditions
• Whether they considered returning to their departure 
point or performing a 180 degrees to avoid weather
• Whether they had to divert from their planned des-
tination and if so, was it before or after encountering 
the weather
• Whether they encountered the weather after reaching 
the half-way point of the flight
• What they did to prevent the encounter with weather 
from being worse
• Whether they would have done anything differently
Procedures
The structured interview was conducted using a 
conference call involving scientists from CAMI, Clem-
son university, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical university 
(ERAu), and the pilot participant. After reviewing the 
purpose of the interview and confirming the anonymous 
nature of the study and other elements of the informed 
consent, the roughly one-hour structured interview was 
conducted (see Appendix A for the actual structured 
interview questions). Responses were independently 
recorded for later comparison. Note that the interview 
was not audio-taped, only hand-written or typed notes 
of the interview were produced.
After the interview was completed, recorded responses 
were compared to ensure the accuracy of the record. A 
single consensus file was then sent to the pilot for review. 
This gave the pilot-participant an opportunity to ensure 
the accuracy of the recorded responses and to modify or 
clarify any responses given during the interview. Once 
the interview had been reviewed and accuracy ensured 
by all parties, the responses were combined with the 
others contained within a de-identified master database 
of pilot interviews.
Weather Information
In addition to pilot interview data, information was 
obtained regarding the atmospheric conditions during 
the time and at the location of each flight and weather 
encounter. Archived meteorological data associated with 
each event in the final database were obtained from the 
National Climatic Data Center. Relevant aviation weather 
reports were reviewed including: 
• Routine aviation meteorological reports (METARs)
• Terminal aerodrome forecasts (TAFs)
• Airman’s meteorological information (AIRMETs)
• Significant meteorological information/ advisories 
(SIGMETs)
• Precipitation reflectivity fields from the National 
Weather Service’s Doppler Radar Network
The METARs and TAFs were collected for the de-
parture, destination, and encounter/diversion times and 
locations in each case. The AIRMETs, SIGMETs, and 
radar data were collected for the routes/times of flight, and 
the encounter times and locations were also documented. 
RESULTS
Pilot information
All pilots interviewed were male, ranging in age from 
20 to 72 years old, with an average age of 50 years. Ten 
pilots (40.0%) were between the ages of 40 and 59, and 
nine (36.0%) were 60 and over. All pilots had completed 
some college coursework and almost half (48.0%) had 
received graduate level training. Many of the pilot 
participants were employed as professional pilots or as 
business owners.
Pilot Certification
 All pilots had a basic pilot certification of airplane 
single engine land and were medically certified to fly. 
Over half (60.0%) held a Class III (private pilot only) 
medical certificate, with the remaining pilots holding 
either a Class II (commercial, non-airline duties, and 
private pilot; 24%) or Class I (scheduled airline) medical 
certificate (16%). In addition to the single engine land 
rating, 36.0% of pilots held a multi-engine rating, 24.0% 
held a commercial rating, and 20.0% were certified flight 
instructors. Additionally, most of the pilots (76.0%) were 
instrument rated.
Flight Experience
Although flight experience varied greatly among the 
pilots, our pilot cohort can be considered experienced 
pilots. A summary of their flight experience is presented in 
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Table 1. As can be seen, experience varied greatly, ranging 
from 130 total hours to 20,000 total hours. The median 
for the group was 1,100 total hours of experience. Note 
that because of the wide range in flight hours, the median 
was viewed as the best measure of central tendency. Actual 
instrument flight time also varied markedly, ranging from 
4 to 2,970 hours with a median of 164 hours.
Most of the pilots (56.0%) first learned to fly within 
10 years of the adverse weather encounter. More than 
two-thirds of the pilots (68.0%) received some degree 
of formal flight instruction within the year prior to the 
weather encounter. However, two (8.0%) of the pilots 
had not received formal flight instruction in more than 
a decade. 
The majority of the pilots (80.0%) had completed at 
least one biennial flight review (BFR), and most (70%) 
had completed a BFR within 1 year of the weather en-
counter. It was also interesting that almost half (48.0%) 
of the pilots had participated in FAA-sponsored WINGS 
programs, which provide voluntary training to enhance 
pilot proficiency and safety. 
Physical and Mental Health
The majority of the pilots (92.0%) reported feeling 
well on the day of the weather encounter. Those who were 
feeling worse than normal that day reported allergies or 
were recovering from being sick a few days prior to the 
flight. However, all had obtained a good night’s sleep 
the night before the flight. Most did not feel pressured 
to get to their destination; however 20.0% of the pilots 
reported having some form of motivation to arrive at 
their planned destination (i.e., wanting to get home as 
soon as possible.)
Aircraft information
Not surprisingly, a variety of aircraft was represented in 
our sample. Most of the aircraft were owned by the pilot 
(60.0%). The remaining pilots flew either a company-
owned (24.0%) or rental (16.0%) aircraft. 
Several types of aircraft were represented in this study. 
While most were single-engine, propeller-driven aircraft 
(e.g., Cessna, Beechcraft; 84.0%), there were a few multi-
engine aircraft (e.g., KingAir and Piper; 12.0%) and one 
Learjet. The top-three aircraft manufacturers were Cessna 
(32.0%), Piper (20.0%), and Mooney (16.0%). 
Almost all (96.0%) of the pilots had at least one GPS 
inside the aircraft. Approximately two-thirds (62.5%) of 
the aircraft had terrain avoidance equipment and over 
half (56.0%) had on-board weather-avoidance equip-
ment. Almost half (44.0%) of the aircraft had de-icing 
equipment, and most (79.2%) were equipped with an 
autopilot. 
Preflight planning
Preflight planning is critical in every flight. Included 
in a comprehensive preflight are such things as the aero-
nautical integrity of the aircraft, engine maintenance, fuel 
quantity, route planning, alternate airports, and weather. 
While all are important, route planning, alternate airports, 
and preflight weather planning were of greatest concern 
in this study. 
Route Planning
Our sample included routes across a variety of geo-
graphical locations; however, most occurred in the South-
ern and Northwest Mountain regions, as defined by the 
FAA. A regional map of where the weather encounters 
occurred is presented in Figure 1. 
The majority of the flights (75.0%) took place during 
the day and were conducted mainly for business (40.0%) 
and pleasure (48.0%); the remaining flights were for 
multiple purposes (8.0%) and training (4.0%.) Most of 
the flights (80.0%) were planned to last up to 5 hours, 
with an average flight time of just more than 2 hours. 
The majority (76.0%) of pilots had planned a visual 
approach to landing at their destination.
All pilots considered the geography that they would 
encounter enroute and approximately two-thirds (64.0%) 
had flown the route before. Likewise, most (64.0%) of 
the pilots had planned an alternate airport in advance of 
Table 1. Pilot participant flight experience 
 Median Minimum Maximum 
Total flight hours 1,100.0 130.0 20,000.0 
Total hours in event aircraft 
make/model 300.0 4.0 5,000.0 
Total hours in last 90 days 40.0 2.0 250.0 
Cross-country hours 700.0 35.0 14,000.0 
Cross-country hours in last 90 days 36.0 0.0 250.0 
Actual instrument hours (n=16) 164.0 4.0 2,970.0 
Simulated instrument hours (n=13) 45.0 10.0 242.0 
Total instrument hours (n=15) 145.0 7.0 3,000.0 
Note: Flight hours were rounded to the nearest tenth. 
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takeoff in the event of encountering difficulties enroute. 
While alternate airports may not be important when flying 
locally, most of these flights involved cross-country flying, 
and alternate airports should normally be considered. 
Weather Planning
All pilots had obtained some type of weather informa-
tion prior to departure on the day of the weather encounter, 
and most (76.0%) accessed weather information less than 
30 minutes before departure. The sources that the pilots 
used to access weather information varied. However, 
only three pilots experienced difficulty accessing weather 
 information in their typical manner; in those cases, weather 
information was obtained from alternate sources.
Pilots were also asked about the weather services they 
used during the day of the encounter and which services 
they typically used. However, after a few interviews, the 
questions were modified to increase the specificity of the 
pilot responses. Table 2 presents the number of weather 
services that the pilot participants used, both typically 
and on the day of the weather encounter. 
The data revealed that the pilots in this study “typi-
cally” used between one and nine weather sources to ac-
cess weather information, with an average of 5.6 sources. 
Table 2. Number of pilots using the specified weather services on the day of the 
weather encounter and in general (n=22)1 
 Number of Pilots 
Number of sources Used day of encounter 
Typically 
used 
1 0 1 
2 4 0 
3 6 4 
4 4 3 
5 2 2 
6 2 3 
7 4 3 
8 0 4 
9 0 2 
1Note that the sample size is 22 because this item was added after the first interviews were complete. 
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Indeed, roughly half (54.5%) of these pilots typically 
used six or more weather sources. 
That being said, on the day of the weather encounter, 
the pilots “actually” used slightly fewer weather sources–
between two and seven weather sources to obtain weather 
information, with an average of 4.2 sources. Moreover, on 
the day of the weather encounter, only 27.3% of the pilots 
used six or more weather sources – roughly half of what 
was reported as “typically” used.
The type(s) of weather service(s) used by pilots typically 
and on the day of the weather encounter were very similar 
(Table 3). For instance, the top three weather providers used 
on the day of the weather encounter were Flight Service 
Stations, National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA), and the Weather Channel. However, that is not 
the entire story, as all of the weather providers, except for 
one category, were used less frequently on the day of the 
event, compared to typical usage rates.
As can be seen from Tables 4 and 5, most flights were 
forecast to depart in VMC with the actual weather at 
departure the same or better than predicted. However, 
most of the pilots (60.0%) encountered adverse weather 
enroute, with almost two-thirds of the encounters (64.0%) 
occurring past the halfway point of the flight.
Instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and ic-
ing were the two most frequently encountered weather 
conditions. Table 6 shows all types of weather encountered.
Most of the pilots (96.0%) reported being aware of the 
adverse weather and where it was headed. However, the 
majority of the pilots (96.0%) ended up entering the weather 
anyway. In fact, only a little more than half of those pilots 
(58.3%) even considered performing a 180 degree turn 
to return to the departure airport or an alternate airport. 
As expected, the majority of pilots (92.0%) deviated at 
some point from their planned route or altitude. The two 
pilots who did not deviate from their planned routes were 
Table 3. Weather services used that day and typically used, by number of pilots (n=22)2 
Used Day of Encounter Typically Used 
National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration 14 63.6% 16 72.7% 
Flight Service Station 15 68.2% 17 77.3% 
DUATS 11 50.0% 12 54.5% 
Commercial vendor 11 50.0% 
17 
77.3% 
Hazardous In-flight Weather Advisory Service 4 18.2% 
9 
40.9% 
Transcribed Weather Broadcast 3 13.6% 
5 
22.7% 
Pilots Automatic Telephone Weather Answering 
Service 
0 
0.0% 
1 
4.5% 
En Route Flight Advisory Service 6 27.3% 
10 
45.5% 
Weather Channel 12 54.5% 
16 
72.7% 
Other Pilots 6 27.3% 
13 
59.1% 
2Note that the sample size is 22 because this item was added after the first interviews were complete.  
 
Table 4. Weather forecast 
 VMC Marginal VMC IMC 
Departure Airport 16 (72.7%) 
3 
(13.6%) 
3 
(13.6%) 
En Route 8 (36.4%) 
6 
(27.3%) 
8 
(36.4%) 
Destination Airport 13 (61.9%) 
5 
(23.8%) 
3 
 (14.3%) 
Note: n= 22 data for the departure and en route forecasts and n=21 for the destination forecast 
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Table 5. Actual weather experienced as compared with forecasted weather3 
 Better Same Worse 
Departure Airport 3 (14.3%) 
16 
(76.2%) 
2 
(9.5%) 
En Route 2 (9.5%) 
6 
(28.6%) 
13 
(61.9%) 
Destination Airport 0 (0%) 
4 
(44.4%) 
5 
 (55.6%) 
3Four pilot data points were missing for departure and en route (N=21). Many pilots did not make it to the 
intended destination airport (N=9). 
 
Table 6. Type of weather encountered4 
 Percentage 
Thunderstorm 17.0% 
Icing 41.7% 
IMC 50.0% 
Non-Convective 
Turbulence 4.2% 
MVMC 8.0% 
4Pilots encountered multiple types of weather; 
therefore, the sum of percentages equal more than 
100%. 
very close to their intended destination or on the taxiway 
at the destination airport when the weather encounter oc-
curred. However, the majority who deviated (73.9%) did 
so after encountering the weather. Even though a majority 
of the participants deviated, 87.5% were aware of where 
they were relative to their course and location. 
The majority of the pilots (76.0%) reported that they 
had previously flown in similar conditions. 
Because many of the pilots were identified using air 
traffic controller flight assists, it is not surprising that 
all but one pilot (96.0%) communicated with air traffic 
control. A variety of in-flight services were requested of 
air traffic control and flight service. While a few (12.0%) 
pilots requested as many as five services, the majority 
of the pilots made only one (28.0%) or two (24.0%) 
requests in-flight. As illustrated in Figure 2, the most 
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commonly requested in-flight services were vectors to 
an airport, weather updates, and PIREPS. Interestingly, 
half of the pilots already had IFR clearance for the flight, 
and around one-third (36.4%) of the remaining pilots 
requested IFR in-flight. 
It is interesting to note that more than half of these 
weather encounters (56.0%) were exacerbated by equip-
ment failures, which can have dramatic impacts on pilot 
decision-making. For example, in a series of studies in-
volving GA pilots, Beringer & Harris (2007) were able 
to show that automation-related (i.e., runaway pitch-
trim up and down, roll servo failure, roll sensor failure, 
and pitch drift up) and mechanical failures (e.g., failed 
attitude indicator) can result in the a variety of piloting 
errors resulting in the loss of the aircraft. Put simply, 
the presence of a mechanical malfunction increases the 
likelihood that an error will occur.
DISCUSSION
Human decision-making in general, and pilot decision-
making in particular, is largely dependent upon three key 
elements: 1) information – is the information accurate 
and timely; 2) knowledge – does the individual have the 
requisite knowledge to utilize the information present; 
and 3) experience – has the individual obtained sufficient 
experience with a given situation or similar situations 
to make a correct assessment (Patterson & Shappell, in 
review). The likelihood that a decision will be successful 
is markedly reduced if any of these three components are 
absent or lacking. It can also be argued that motivation 
influences to what extent the three elements (informa-
tion, knowledge, and experience) will be considered in 
the decision-making process.
With this in mind, the 25 weather encounters were 
classified into one of five categories using the interview 
data and narrative summary of the encounter provided 
by the pilot participants. The categories utilized were: 
•	 Motivation.	Referred to by some as “get-home-itis,” 
some pilots feel pressured to get to their destination. 
That pressure can be either external or internal.
•	 Lack	 of	 complete	 weather	 information.	 In some 
instances, pilots do not receive complete weather infor-
mation and/or do not recognize that the information 
provided is insufficient.
•	 Conflicting	weather	information.		In some instances, 
sources of weather information may be in variance. For 
instance, on-board NExRAD radar may be indicating 
a break in convective activity, while ATC and/or Flight 
Service may report the same area as IMC.
•	 Lack	of	appreciation/understanding	of	the	weather.	
Some pilots may not understand the implications of 
the weather, or if they do, they may not appreciate 
the threat to flight safety that adverse weather poses. 
In effect, these pilots lacked a practical strategy for 
managing the weather hazard they faced.
•	 Not/applicable.  This category was included to capture 
those encounters that could not be classified within 
the previous four categories (e.g., encounters due to 
mechanical failures).
As can be seen in Figure 3, roughly one-fourth of the 
adverse weather encounters were driven by the motiva-
tion of pilots to get to their destination. These instances 
may explain at least some of the violations that have 
been identified in the accident record by Wiegmann et 
al. (2005). However, the majority of adverse weather 
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encounters were due to a lack of understanding/apprecia-
tion of the weather conditions (52.0%). Surprisingly, few 
adverse weather encounters were caused by incomplete 
or conflicting weather information (8.0%). Note that 
four weather encounters did not fit into any of the afore-
mentioned categories. After revisiting the uncategorized 
(N/A) encounters, all but one could be attributed to a 
technological malfunction (e.g., a malfunctioning on-
board weather radar).
What’s more, the lack of understanding/appreciation 
of the weather did not seem to be isolated to any specific 
type of adverse weather event (Table 7). That is, the lack 
of appreciation/understanding of weather was spread 
across weather hazards. In contrast, nearly all adverse 
weather encounters that involved misplaced motivation 
were coupled with general IMC, rather than the more 
dangerous convective weather. This suggests that when 
faced with exceptionally bad weather, motivation may not 
have as much influence on pilot behavior as originally 
thought. 
In general then, it would appear from this study that 
rather than willfully disregarding the rules, many of the 
pilots simply committed decision errors, as described 
within HFACS1 (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Indeed, 
these decision errors were consistent with many of the 
explanations of why pilots fly into adverse weather, pro-
vided by Wiegmann et al. (2008). Explanations such as 
the lack of knowledge and experience, poor pre-flight 
planning, limited weather evaluation skills, and poor 
in-flight planning all would contribute to decision errors 
and seem to corroborate the findings presented here.
1The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) 
is a theoretically based tool for investigating and analyzing human 
error associated with accidents and incidents. HFACS was developed 
by expanding upon Reason’s (1990) “Swiss-cheese” model of human 
error. The basic premise underlying this taxonomy is that an accident 
is generally a series of events. The sequence of preceding events are 
purported to include both latent and active errors. The HFACS 
taxonomy defines 19 causal categories of human error whereby the 
accident’s progression is categorized. These categories are housed 
within four levels (i.e., unsafe acts, preconditions for unsafe acts, 
unsafe supervision, and organizational influences) of human error. 
See Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) for an in-depth description.
Does this mean that previous findings (e.g., Wiegmann 
et al., 2005; Detwiler et al., 2006) were flawed that sug-
gested that many GA weather-related accidents are due 
to violations? Not necessarily. It could be that there are 
fundamental differences between fatal and non-fatal 
encounters with weather. Indeed, data from those studies 
suggest that most fatal weather encounters are associated 
with violations, while non-fatal weather encounters are 
more indicative of decision errors (Wiegmann et al., 2005; 
Detwiler et al., 2006). Obviously, the majority of events 
presented here did not involve accidents on fatalities. 
It can also be argued that the experience level of the 
pilots in this study was considerably higher than those 
GA pilots examined in previous analysis of the NTSB 
accident database (Goh & Wiegmann, 2002). Roughly 
40% of the pilots in the analysis of the NTSB accident 
database possessed an instrument rating, while a much 
larger proportion (76%) of the pilots in this study were 
instrument rated. 
On the other hand, and perhaps more troubling, it 
could be that the lack of available information following 
fatal weather encounters may bias investigators to resort 
to explanations more indicative of the willful disregard 
for the rules and regulations (i.e., violations). Without 
substantiating information from occupants of the aircraft 
or those with intimate knowledge of the pilot, field in-
vestigators are often left with little more than superficial 
descriptions of accidents that may lack the specificity 
required to rule out violations. unfortunately, it will 
never truly be known what decisions were made in the 
cockpit when the pilots suffer fatal injuries. Indeed, there 
may be more to the story. This study showed how pilot 
decision-making and the lack of understanding of key 
weather information could easily lead to fatal accidents. 
For many, it was a matter of good fortune that under 
different circumstances (i.e., different amount of fuel, 
time of day, lack of ATC assistance, no hole in the cloud 
layer), the outcome could have resulted in a serious or 
fatal accident. 
It is noteworthy that the findings presented here seem 
to support those reported by the NTSB (2005). Recall 
that NTSB researchers interviewed pilots who were in the 
Table 7. Decision category by type of weather 
Hazard Lack of Appreciation/ Understanding of Weather Motivation 
Conflicting Weather 
Information 
Lack of Complete 
Weather 
Information 
IMC  5 4 0 1 
Icing  6 1 1 0 
Non-convective 
Turbulence  0 0 0 1 
Convective 
Weather  4 0 0 0 
Marginal VFR  1 1 0 0 
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general vicinity of those whose encounter with adverse 
weather resulted in a fatal accident. In contrast, the pilots 
interviewed in this study actually encountered the weather.
Consistent with the “accident pilots” in the NTSB 
study, many of the pilots interviewed in this study were 
older and started flight training later in life – both areas of 
concern identified by the NTSB (NTSB, 2005). Likewise, 
the data presented here regarding use of weather resources 
by pilots are consistent with that observed for pilots fly-
ing in the vicinity of the accident pilots. Specifically, the 
data presented here suggest that pilots utilize a variety 
of weather sources and that no identifiable “standard” 
approach to weather pre-flight planning appears to exist 
within GA. unfortunately, it remains largely unknown 
what specific weather sources the accident pilots in the 
NTSB study utilized.
Given the proliferation of commercial weather products 
and on-board weather equipment, it may be time to move 
toward some form of standard weather package that all 
pilots would review before flying. Exactly what products/
equipment should be used remains to be defined; however, 
it is clear that some weather products and providers are 
considered more useful and/or are accessed more often 
than others (NASA, 2007). For instance, FSS, DuATS, 
and NOAA/NWS, were all utilized in both the NASA 
study and here. Similarly, Knecht (2008a) surveyed 230 
GA pilots from locations across the country (CA, OK, 
ND, IL, FL) and found that the FAA standard briefing 
was used on a majority of flights, followed by the NWS/
NOAA and DuATS. Beringer and Schvaneveldt (2002) 
found close agreement, for the most part, between the 
ratings of weather information items by both novice and 
experienced pilots. They recommended, based upon these 
findings, that one could develop algorithms, not unlike 
Pilot’s Associate, that would prioritize weather informa-
tion by phase of flight for presentation on flight-deck 
displays, thereby potentially reducing display clutter and 
emphasizing salience.
Of course, simply accessing weather data does not 
necessarily mean that one paid attention to relevant 
information or that the information was even fully un-
derstood. It is sound and practical weather training and 
decision-making that can prevent accidents. For instance, 
Knecht (2008a) found that pilots spent an average of 17-20 
minutes reviewing information from weather products/
providers prior to departure and 7 minutes reviewing 
information while enroute. However, the bottom 5% of 
the pilots sampled only spent 5-7 minutes on products/
providers, and less than 2 minutes enroute. Whether or 
not relevant weather information can be extracted in 
such little time depends upon the nature of the weather 
and the end user’s proficiency. However, it is somewhat 
disconcerting that something as critical as weather in-
formation could be allotted only a few minutes during 
pre-flight planning and even less in-flight.
unfortunately, similar information was not obtained 
in this study. What we were able to determine was the 
type of weather information pilots possessed or had avail-
able during the flight. Specifically, archival AIRMET/
SIGMET reports, weather radar data, and interview data 
made it possible to compare the information that pilots 
had versus the information actually available during the 
time of the encounter. An examination of the pilot re-
sponses in this study revealed that in most encounters there 
were more data sources available than the pilot actually 
accessed/obtained. In some situations, for example, the 
appropriate AIRMET/SIGMET was in effect along the 
route of flight and/or radar echoes were present, yet the 
pilot did not obtain them, or if they did, the information 
was misunderstood. 
It would appear that knowledge and training about 
specific weather products and what information they 
can provide might prevent encounters with adverse 
weather from happening in the future. On the surface, 
this recommendation may seem obvious and perhaps 
redundant, given that weather-related training is required 
of all pilots before licensure. However, a review of train-
ing requirements for weather hazards reveals that private 
pilot applicants “must receive and log ground training from 
an authorized instructor or complete a home-study course on 
… recognition of critical weather situations from the ground 
and in flight, windshear avoidance, and the procurement 
and use of aeronautical weather reports and forecasts” (14 
CFR 61.105). Even VFR-only pilots are given some 
instrument flight training as a precaution, so they can 
“maintain control of an aircraft while making a course 
reversal or diversion if they inadvertently enter clouds” 
(NTSB, 2005). 
The issue is not whether or not a pilot should receive 
meteorological training – the regulations clearly state 
that they should and requirements are in place to ensure 
training is provided. The better question is “How does 
one adequately educate and train a pilot applicant to 
guarantee that the aforementioned requirements are met?” 
There appears to be no standard in the case of educating 
pilots on meteorology and training them to use weather 
analysis and forecast products properly. In fact, the only 
specific hazard discussed in the regulations cited above 
is wind shear. An interesting comparison can be made 
to stall recovery and avoidance training. During primary 
flight training, the student receives hands-on experience 
in stalls. This is straightforward, as stall training can be 
easily introduced. Practical introductions to managing 
weather-hazard areas cannot be as easily simulated.
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One source of training materials and a useful resource 
is the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM; FAA 
[2008]). The AIM includes a description of weather prod-
ucts as well as additional sources of weather information. 
However, while the AIM details many of these products, 
there are no specifics on what is required to be taught. It 
is unclear if pilots have been trained to interpret weather 
products adequately and make sound decisions based on 
their interpretation, or if they were taught just enough 
about each product to pass an examination. Should the 
latter scenario be the case, then it is possible that once an 
examination is over, a pilot may rarely consult some or 
all of these products in the future due to an incomplete 
understanding during initial training.
It is also interesting to note that a pilot can get all avia-
tion weather questions wrong on the airman knowledge 
test (suggesting a total lack of weather knowledge), yet still 
pass the exam enroute to a private pilot’s license (Wieg-
mann et al., 2008; NTSB, 2005). Likewise, during the 
required biennial flight review (BFR), “… the instructor 
giving the flight review is free to determine the content; 
therefore, the BFR may or may not include a demon-
stration of the weather knowledge and instrument flight 
skills required for initial certification” (NTSB, 2005).
Therefore, it is conceivable that after becoming certified 
a pilot would not be capable of interpreting risks associ-
ated with adverse weather and throughout their career 
may never be required to demonstrate knowledge on 
aviation-specific weather information products. Perhaps 
what is needed is either a refinement of the current airman 
knowledge test requirements, required weather-related 
items on the BFR, or some new approach to weather 
instruction like scenario-based weather training/testing. 
Maybe then, an improved understanding of weather and 
its implications while flying can be fostered throughout 
the GA community.
Finally, it would be disingenuous to suggest that all 25 
adverse weather encounters were solely human factors-
related, since more than half of the weather encounters 
were associated with some form of equipment failure. 
A sampling of the mechanical failures encountered by 
the pilots in this study included bad cells of an aircraft’s 
battery; malfunctioning communication and navigation 
equipment like the radios, VOR (VHF Omnidirectional 
Range), GPS, and DME (Distance Measuring Equip-
ment)). In each case, the aircraft was still operational; 
however, at a minimum, the equipment failure(s) pro-
duced a distraction but, in some cases, exacerbated the 
encounter with adverse weather.
CONCLUSIONS AND  
LESSONS LEARNED
Although the data presented here embodied the col-
lective experiences of 25 GA pilots who encountered 
adverse weather in flight, the data have limitations. For 
instance, the sample was small and does not directly 
reflect the regional distribution of pilots within the u.S. 
Specifically, none of the pilots in this study were from the 
Western-Pacific or Central Regions. Furthermore, even 
though the largest number of participants came from the 
Northwest Mountain Region, none of the pilots were 
from Alaska where GA aviation is a prominent form 
of transportation. Likewise, roughly 3/4ths of the pilots 
interviewed in this study held an instrument rating. This 
is similar to the Nall report’s findings that slightly over 
half of the pilots involved in weather-related accidents 
were instrument-rated (AOPA, 2008). 
It can also be argued that the pilots who volunteered 
to participate in our study did so because they felt that 
they simply made an honest mistake and did not will-
fully violate existing Federal Air Regulations (FARs). 
Whereas, the others who did not volunteer, may have 
declined because they knew that they were in viola-
tion and may have been reluctant to participate in an 
FAA-sponsored inquiry into why pilots fly into adverse 
weather. While it is impossible to know precisely why 
many pilots declined to participate (i.e., we did not ask 
them), it is possible that their participation would have 
increased the number of motivation-related encounters 
with adverse weather that may have driven the number 
of willful violations of FARs closer to those seen in 
previous GA accident studies. 
Nevertheless, the data presented here do shed addi-
tional light on the conundrum of why a GA pilot would 
fly into adverse weather. Contrary to what the accident 
record seems to suggest, flight into adverse weather 
seems to be primarily due to the lack of appreciation/
understanding of the hazards associated with adverse 
weather. Perhaps some encounters with adverse weather 
were motivated by outside influences or exacerbated by 
some manner of mechanical failure that may have led to 
the willful acceptance of unnecessary hazards. Simply 
put, there may be more to the story.
Furthermore, it would appear that additional ef-
fort should be placed in training, both ab initio and 
recurrent. Emphasis should be placed on ensuring a 
full understanding of the adverse impact of weather, 
including the recognition of IMC, icing, convective 
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events, etc. Moreover, we recommend a standard weather 
briefing that includes multiple, converging sources of 
information.
In addition to analyzing the interview data to determine 
trends and patterns, it was also our intent to develop 
disciplined methods for analyzing future accidents and 
incidents. Ideally, this would enable investigators to 
better learn from these incidents, improve correction of 
involved personnel, and generate interventions. Specifi-
cally, we planned to generate a list of items and/or data 
points for investigators to gain a better understanding of 
what happened within a particular weather event. The 
structured interview and weather information gathered 
met that goal.
We had also intended to derive a simple standard 
protocol aimed at identifying relevant weather-related 
events that could be used by Flight Standards or other 
research teams, but this did not happen. unfortunately, 
identifying cases by reviewing lists of flight assists and 
weather events listed in The Administrator’s Daily Alert 
Bulletins was extremely time-consuming. 
Selecting a set of potential adverse weather encounters 
was only the first step. A great deal of work remained to 
identify the appropriate FSDO, gain access to pilot contact 
information, contact the potential pilot-participant, and 
garner informed consent. However, in some cases, the 
FSDO did not have contact information or they did not 
have a record of the event. This was surprising because, 
according to the FAA’s Air Traffic Quality Assurance 
process, flights assists are to be reported to the appropri-
ate FSDO via the Regional Operations Center (ROC) 
within 3 hours of occurrence (7210.56C; FAA, 2002).
If the process of this study were to be duplicated 
or initiated as a proactive collection of near-miss data, 
the procedure would need to become formalized and 
streamlined across air traffic facilities and FSDOs. In 
addition, it would be useful if the standard flight assist 
form could be modified to archive key weather-related 
variables, many of which are identified within the struc-
tured interview used. Alternatively, the survey could be 
modified and streamlined for use by ASIs when conduct-
ing their investigations.
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APPENDIx A
A.  Aircraft Information
 1.  Aircraft Type
 2.  Aircraft ownership (Own (full or part), rent, other)?
B.  Basic Aircrew Information (Confirming demographic data)
 1.  Age at time of incident
 2.  Education (HS, College, graduate)
 3.  Profession/Occupation
 4.  Gender
 5. When did you first learn to fly?
 6.  Total Flight Hours
 7.  Flight Hours in Make/Model
 8. Flight Hours in the last 90 days
 9. Total Cross-Country Flight Hours (cross country defined as greater than 25nm from airport)
 10. Cross Country Flight Hours in last 90 days
 11. Ratings/Certificates
 12. Are you instrument rated? If so, how much instrument experience have you had (simulated and actual)?
 13. Do you participate in the WINGS program?
 14. Date of most recent flight instruction
 15. Year of most recent biennial flight review (BFR)
 16. Date of most recent medical exam
 17. Class of medical certificate (Class I, II, or III)
  a. Any waivers/limitations on the medical certificate
 18. If you used any of the following equipment, have you had training on it? If yes, what kind and how much?
  a. Communication Equipment
  b. De-icing Equipment
  c. Weather-avoidance Equipment
  d. Terrain-avoidance Equipment
  e. Autopilot
  f. GPS
  g. Additional Avionics (i.e., Altitude alert, radar altimeters)
  h. Multifunctional Displays (i.e. GPWS, TCAS)
C. Event Information
 1. Please describe the day of the flight.
 2. What was the purpose of the flight? (air tour, business, emergency medical, ferry, freight, passenger, pleasure, 
training)
 3. Have you made this trip before? If so, how many times?
 4. Preflight
  a. What is your normal method of preflight planning 
  b. Was your method of preflight planning on the day of the incident different from normal?
  c. Did you attempt to obtain pre-flight weather information?
   1. If yes, when was the last time you checked weather before flight
  d. Did you have an alternate plan with alternate airports worked out in advance?
  e. Did you consider the geography along the flight route (e.g. mountains, rising terrain, etc.)? 
  f. Which weather provider(s) were used? 
   1. National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NWS)
   2. Flight Service Station
   3. Direct user Access Terminal Service (DuATS)
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   4. Commercial Vendors
   5. Hazardous In-flight Weather Advisory Service
   6. Transcribed Weather Broadcast (TWB)
   7. Pilot Automatic Telephone Weather Answering Service
   8. En-route Flight Advisory Service
   9. The Weather Channel
   10. Other Pilots
   11. Other (please specify):
    a. What type of information did you gather?
  g. What weather providers(s) do you typically use?
   1. National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NWS)
   2. Flight Service Station
   3. Direct user Access Terminal Service (DuATS)
   4. Commercial Vendors
   5. Hazardous In-flight Weather Advisory Service
   6. Transcribed Weather Broadcast (TWB)
   7. Pilot Automatic Telephone Weather Answering Service
   8. En-route Flight Advisory Service
   9. The Weather Channel
   10. Other Pilots
   11. Other (please specify):
  h. Were any of your attempts to obtain pre-flight weather information unsuccessful? If yes, why?
   1. Did not know or were unable to find telephone or access numbers
   2. No telephone available
   3. No answer on telephone
   4. Telephone briefer did not have all requested information available
   5. Telephone briefer denied service
   6. No online access available
   7. Could not connect online
   8. Could not maintain online connection
   9. Required information not available on computer
   10. Experienced difficulty with computer interface
   11. Other (please specify)
  i. What was the preflight weather forecast for the following?
   1. Departure airport (VMC/Marginal VMC/IMC)
   2. En-route (VMC/Marginal VMC/IMC)
   3. Destination airport (VMC/Marginal VMC/IMC)
   4. Did not obtain a preflight weather briefing
    a. If you did NOT attempt to obtain pre-flight weather information prior to departure, why not?
     i. Did not believe pre-departure weather was necessary
     ii. Was intimidated by process of obtaining weather
     iii. Did not know or was unable to find telephone or access number
     iv. No Telephone available
     v. No online access available
     vi. Other (please specify)
  j. What was the planned length of flight?
  k. Where did you depart from and when?
  l. Where did you arrive and when?
  m. What type of approach was planned for your destination? (CAT I, CAT II, CAT III)
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  n. Did you get a good night’s sleep the night before?
  o. How were you feeling on the day of the flight (e.g. sick, allergies, etc)?
 5. In-flight
  a. What were the environmental conditions?
   1. Lighting conditions? (Day, Night, Dawn, Dusk, Cloudy, Sunny, Bright, Dark, etc…)
   2. Weather
   3. Temperature (degrees Fahrenheit)
  b. What was the weather like?
   1. At departure
   2. At destination
   3. During the Route
  c. Were you under any pressure to get to your destination?
  d. Did you have to deviate from the planned route or altitude?
   1. If yes, was it before or after you encountered weather?
  e. Were you aware of your course and location throughout the flight?
  f. Did you communicate with ATC?
  g. Did you communicate with any other en-route services (e.g. flight service stations)?
  h. What in-flight services did you request?
   1. Emergency climb/descent
   2. IFR clearance
   3. Vectors to an airport
   4. Vectors to VMC
   5. PIREPS
   6. Weather updates
   7. IAP
   8. Other (please specify)
  i. Were there any distractions in the cockpit? (e.g., passengers, malfunctions.)?
  j. Was all the equipment working during the flight?
  k. What was your level of awareness of the weather (e.g., Did you know where the bad weather was headed?)
 6. upon encountering the weather
  a. During what point of the flight did you encounter weather?
   1. Was the pilot past the midpoint of the flight before realizing there was trouble?
  b. Was the actual weather better than, the same as, or worse than forecasted
   1. Departure (Better/Same/Worse)
   2. En-route (Better/Same/Worse)
   3. Destination (Better/Same/Worse)
  c. Can you explain your thought processes upon encountering the weather?
  d. Can you explain how you felt upon encountering the weather?
  e. Did you enter the weather? 
   1. If yes, did you consider flying a 180? 
  f. Have you ever experienced similar weather conditions in-flight?
   1. If yes, what did you do?
D. CONCLuDING THOuGHTS
 1.  Is there anything that you feel we should know?
 2. What did you do that prevented this incident from being worse?
 3. Knowing what you know now, would you have done anything differently?

